Sir Charles Guthrie’s assertion that a ground war remains a possibility opens a fascinating question. Why are the British, virtually alone among the NATO allies, so intensely interested in the ground war option? The United States has pretty clearly rejected the option, as have the Canadians. The Germans have been consistently opposed. The two countries that would need to cooperate in the event of a ground war by making port facilities available, Italy and Greece, are adamantly opposed to the very idea. Why are the British, virtually alone, still raising the option.

Part of the answer probably is that they know that there won’t be a ground war. Knowing that they will not be asked to pay the price of a ground war frees the British to advocate one without risking anything. The primary purpose for this now pointless public posturing is that it allows Blair to score domestic political points. By advocating a ground war, Blair projects himself as a resolute and forceful leader surrounded by weaklings. He shores up his strength in the area in which Labor is traditionally weakest, national security policy. This allows him to make inroads into traditional Conservative nationalist and defense oriented constituencies. It doesn’t hurt him at all that the European NATO members are generally opposed to the ground war, as it helps burnish his non-European credentials among British nationalists at almost no cost to himself. At the same time, extraordinarily, he strengthens his credentials among human rights advocates on the Labor’s left with his strong stance against Milosevic’s alleged war crimes. He pays a price among some left-wing Laborites who reflexively oppose military operations anywhere. However, this constituency is small, already distrusts him, yet has nowhere to go.

Blair’s position makes somewhat less diplomatic sense. The continental NATO powers, particularly Germany and Italy, are already appalled at U.S. leadership of NATO, which from their point of view led them into this mess. Britain’s supercharged advocacy, outstripping even American bellicosity, has raised serious questions in Europe about Blair’s judgement and motives. As the most extreme of NATO’s leaders, Blair has dramatically diminished British influence on foreign policy issues on the continent.

This seems a price Blair is willing to pay. Blair, like Clinton, seems to use foreign policy as an arena in which to generate domestic support. In that sense, this makes sense. This disdain for the opinion of the continental Europeans in favor of domestic political positioning raises interesting questions on a host of Euro-issues coming up. Blair may, of course, believe what he is saying about a ground war, but that is irrelevant now, since a ground war has become politically impossible, as well as militarily difficult. Indeed, it is the very impossibility of a ground offensive that frees Blair to intensify its advocacy.