According to Russian news agencies, Moscow has not yet decided how or even if Russian troops will participate in a Kosovo peacekeeping force. Interfax quoted Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev as saying, "The chief of staff and the defense ministry's department of international military cooperation are working night and day" to propose several options for Russia's participation. However, "Krasnaya Zvezda," the official paper of the Russian defense ministry, expressed concern about the army's role in a Kosovo force if it is placed under NATO command. "Each side (Russia and NATO) has its own understanding of the document adopted in Bonn," the paper said.

Russia’s suggestion – even threat – that it could choose not to participate in a Kosovo peacekeeping force highlights the maneuvering currently underway to reinterpret the G-8 peace agreement to which Belgrade has agreed. The G-8 plan was a compromise between the Rambouillet accord and the Serbian position, primarily on the issue of the makeup and command structure of the international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Rambouillet’s requirement for a wholly NATO force in Kosovo was at the heart of Belgrade’s rejection of the accord, in that it gave no guarantee of present or future Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. The G-8 plan addressed Serbian concerns by proposing an international force under UN command for Kosovo. A neutral UN commander, if not entirely unbiased, at least would not facilitate the gross dismemberment of Serbia, while the presence of non-NATO troops – particularly Russian – would also guarantee Serbian sovereignty.

NATO is now busy trying to reinterpret the G-8 plan as the Rambouillet accord – twisting a compromise back into an unmitigated victory. Washington and London are defining the UN’s role as token at best and are continuing to advance a predominantly NATO force for Kosovo. Russia has responded by threatening to withdraw from the plan. By accepting the G-8 plan, Belgrade won one victory by guaranteeing that Serbia would not lose Kosovo – something not assured under the Rambouillet accord. If the G-8 plan collapses over U.S. and British insistence on a NATO dominated, NATO commanded force, Belgrade will have won a triple victory – framing NATO as the obstacle to peace, undermining Russia’s willingness to compromise with NATO, and thrusting a wedge deep into NATO, between members who accepted the G-8 accord and those who continued to fight for Rambouillet